It’s time to think about the final in Ukraine | Opinion

With the U.S. presidential election looming, the stakes for Ukraine couldn’t be higher. While former President Donald Trump appears uninterested in the intricacies of Ukraine’s fight against Russian aggression, his potential return to the White House would have profound implications for the war and essentially force Ukraine to agree to terms it would not otherwise accept.

His running mate, Ohio Senator JD Vance, has spent the past few days outlining a foreign policy vision that all but guarantees a victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin. He advocated a peace plan that would freeze the conflict along the current front lines, give Russia de facto control of its occupied territories and force Ukraine into neutrality, which would mean a promise not to join NATO or the European Union. He also suggested that Europe, not Russia (or the United States), should bear the cost of reconstruction, estimated at nearly a trillion dollars.

While that sounds like a capitulation, it fits with a new Republican isolationism that stems from a combination of war weariness, economic populism and skepticism of international institutions. There is a growing inclination to prioritize domestic issues like the economy and immigration rather than being the world’s policeman – and a disdain for global alliances like NATO, with many seeing those commitments as burdens that benefit other nations at the expense of American interests.

If Trump and Vance prevail in November, Ukraine faces an existential turning point. Kyiv would have little choice but to secure a clear victory by January 2025, otherwise it would face immense pressure to negotiate terms that could permanently alter its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

Therefore, there is an urgent need to think about and consider what other endgames might look like. Could there be alternatives that do not reward Putin’s aggression quite so dramatically? Appeasing a tyrant’s aggression is not a stance that has been rewarded with peace throughout history. Is there any way to dissuade Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from his maximalist position that insists on a complete Russian withdrawal from occupied territories and pretends that the often nonsensical internal borders of the Soviet Union are somehow sacrosanct?

Behind closed doors, politicians, military officials and analysts are already sketching out possible solutions to the war. Three models offer insight into the outcome of the conflict, with each model presenting its own risks and opportunities for Ukraine’s future.

The Korean model: an unresolved conflict

One possible outcome is reminiscent of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, where North and South Korea entered a military stalemate after a ceasefire in 1953. The conflict has been frozen for decades, and both sides continue to claim the right to reunification on their own terms. In this scenario, Ukraine and Russia could end up in a similar stalemate, with neither able to achieve a clear military victory, but a ceasefire maintaining the fragile peace.

This would create a heavily militarized border similar to Korea’s demilitarized zone (DMZ), where tensions would remain high and sporadic clashes would be a constant threat. The dream of reunification would continue, but under very different visions: Ukraine seeking to regain full sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders, and Russia fomenting separatist movements and openly seeking the destruction of modern Ukraine – but content for now with its successes in Luhansk, Donetsk and Crimea.

Finlandization: Sovereignty has its price

Another possible solution is based on Finland’s experience in the 1940 Winter War with the Soviet Union. After a brief but brutal conflict, Finland ceded territory to the USSR to preserve its independence – but was forced to remain neutral in subsequent global conflicts. The agreement allowed Finland to avoid further Soviet intervention while being careful not to provoke its far larger neighbor. Applied to Ukraine, a similar agreement could mean Kyiv formally ceding Crimea and parts of its east to Russia in exchange for a commitment to neutrality, thus preventing Ukraine from joining NATO or other military alliances. Ukraine would retain its independence and be free from direct Russian rule, but it would be under the shadow of Moscow’s influence.

This appears to be Trump’s vision – and it would be deeply unpopular in Ukraine. After years of fighting for its own sovereignty and aligning itself with the West, accepting Russian territorial gains would be a bitter pill for the Ukrainian government and its people to swallow. It would open a path to peace – but one that would leave Ukraine vulnerable and force it into a neutral stance that could undermine its long-term aspirations.

The Rasmussen Plan: Victory for Ukraine

The seven-point plan for Ukraine, presented by former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit in May 2023, outlines a strategy to ensure Ukraine’s victory and long-term stability. Developed by Rasmussen’s Alliance for Democracies, the plan calls for continued military support for Ukraine until it can join NATO, a complete withdrawal of Russian forces, and the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including Crimea. It also emphasizes holding Russia accountable for war crimes, rebuilding Ukraine with Western help, and integrating Ukraine into the EU and NATO. It rejects any form of compromise with Russia and believes that only a decisive victory will bring lasting peace. By integrating Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic structures, the plan aims to permanently shift the balance of power in Europe and ensure Ukraine’s sovereignty and stability.

But that vision requires long-term support from the West – militarily, financially and politically – at a time of growing war fatigue. While the plan is ambitious, its success depends on sustained international engagement and Ukraine’s ability to maintain its military momentum against larger Russian forces. It’s safe to say Trump won’t go along – and even Harris may waver at some point.

The Rasmussen plan does not provide a timeframe, so it is safe to assume that he too sees it as a utopian vision of the future. He omits the transition phase, and we would like to propose one.

A divided Ukraine: Germany’s renewed Cold War

This scenario would be a post-war scenario similar to that in Germany during the Cold War, in which Ukraine would be split into two separate entities, each aligning itself with opposing world powers. Western Ukraine would join NATO and the European Union, which would be a major advantage for Zelensky – but part of eastern Ukraine, including Crimea and large parts of Donetsk and Luhansk, would remain under Russian control. This would formalize the current de facto division and create a new geopolitical reality on Europe’s eastern flank.

The demarcation line would not include all the territories annexed by Russia, as the current front extends deeper into eastern Ukraine. This would allow either side to declare some kind of victory, and the whole situation would appear to be an interim solution.

Such a division would of course be fraught with dangers. Ukraine’s territorial integrity would be irreparably compromised, and the split could further fuel tensions between NATO and Russia. But to many it appears to be a pragmatic way to avoid all-out war while recognizing the geopolitical realities of the region. Crucially, it would allow for reunification, as has occurred in Germany – which would essentially realize Rasmussen’s goals at some point in the future.

Unlike the division of Germany during the Cold War, however, this separation would be more complex, as there is no clear separation between the spheres of influence of the USA and Russia and the Americans could therefore not act as guarantors of peace.

One possible solution to providing peacekeepers and other tasks may seem counterintuitive: involve China. For China, this could be an opportunity to cement its role as a global power broker by going beyond its traditional economic influence and acting as a guarantor of peace. In doing so, China could become a stronger global team player. There is a certain elegance in this.

If Vice President Kamala Harris becomes president, Zelensky will buy more time — perhaps six months to a year — during which she is expected to maintain President Joe Biden’s current approach: sustained military and economic aid, continued diplomatic support and efforts to keep NATO united against Russia. While that would give Ukraine the resources it needs to keep fighting, Harris would still have to reckon with growing war weariness among both European allies and U.S. voters, many of whom are increasingly concerned about the financial cost of supporting Ukraine in an open-ended conflict.

The longer the war drags on, the more Russia benefits from its human reserves and economic resilience. Putin can afford to wait, but Ukraine cannot. The stark reality is that regardless of who wins the 2024 US election, Ukraine’s window of opportunity to reclaim its lost territories is shrinking.

Kyiv’s decisions are increasingly constrained by forces beyond its control. It may be time for Zelenskyj to borrow something else from Germany: the word Realpolitik.

Mihai Razvan Ungureanu is the former prime minister and foreign minister of Romania, headed the country’s foreign intelligence service, and is a professor of history at the University of Bucharest. Dan Perry is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press, the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books; follow him at danperry.substack.com.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author.